On April 2, multiple sources disclosed that Elon Musk’s SpaceX submitted an Initial Public Offering (IPO) application to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) via confidential filing, with the aim of raising $75 billion—a move that could potentially set a new global IPO record. Analysts estimate SpaceX’s valuation to be approximately $1.75 trillion, largely propelled by its Starlink satellite business.

Interestingly, on the same day, reports surfaced indicating that Amazon is in negotiations to acquire satellite communications company Globalstar, in an effort to expedite its own low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite business and compete with SpaceX’s Starlink. The potential deal is estimated to be worth up to $9 billion.

On one hand, there is an industry pioneer poised to enter the capital markets with a trillion-dollar valuation ambition; on the other hand, there is a newcomer still on the path to catching up, seeking to accelerate its progress through mergers and acquisitions. The simultaneous emergence of these two developments serves as a signal that the LEO satellite internet sector is transitioning from a “technological race” to a “comprehensive confrontation of capital and resources.” If this acquisition comes to fruition, its impact may extend far beyond a mere $9 billion transaction, potentially reshaping the global satellite internet competitive landscape.

$9 Billion: Not Just Buying Assets, But a Time Window

For Amazon, the core significance of this acquisition lies in “seizing time.”

Since 2019, SpaceX has achieved an unprecedented launch frequency through its reusable rocket system. By April 2026, Starlink is projected to have over 10,000 satellites in orbit, accounting for 66% of global active satellites, with over 10 million active users across 155 countries and regions. It commands over 85% of the global LEO satellite internet market share, beginning to bolster the company’s overall valuation.

In contrast, Amazon only recently entered its intensive launch phase, with its current in-orbit satellite count still in the hundreds—far short of its planned 3,200-satellite constellation. In late January, Amazon applied to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for a 24-month waiver or extension to July 2028 to meet its deadline of deploying approximately 1,600 internet satellites by July 2026. The company attributed the delays to factors beyond its control, including “recent supply shortages” of rockets and production disruptions. This slow deployment progress drew strong criticism from the FCC chairman, who stated that Amazon was “about to miss satellite deployment milestones.”

This gap is not merely in “quantity” but also in “time.” Satellite internet is not an industry where latecomers can gradually catch up; its underlying logic resembles that of platform infrastructure: whoever achieves global coverage first has a greater chance of securing spectrum resources, orbital slots, and early high-value customers. Once the network achieves scale, latecomers face not only higher costs but also multiple barriers, including user migration costs, ecosystem lock-in, and service inertia.

More immediate pressure comes from the commercial side. Amazon has already begun signing service contracts, such as providing in-flight Wi-Fi with airlines like Delta, meaning its network construction is no longer just an internal technological advancement but has entered the stage of “fulfilling external commitments.” If deployment progress fails to align with commercial rhythms, it could undermine customer trust and weaken its bargaining power in future market competition.

Against this backdrop, the strategic significance of Amazon’s acquisition of Globalstar becomes clear. Now, let’s examine the acquiree—Globalstar, a veteran satellite mobile communications company headquartered in Louisiana, USA. Its journey has been turbulent: filing for bankruptcy in 2002, resuming operations in 2004 with private equity funding, and reaching a turning point in 2017 when the FCC approved its 2.4GHz band for 5G terrestrial communications. By 2025, Globalstar achieved $273 million in revenue, up 9% year-on-year, with operating profits reaching $7.4 million, turning from loss to profit.

While Globalstar cannot match Starlink in satellite scale or market influence, its L-band and S-band spectrum licenses, global ground gateway network, and years of commercial operational experience constitute the most challenging and time-consuming infrastructure for LEO satellite businesses. Acquiring these resources typically requires navigating complex regulatory approval cycles and long-term capital investment—exactly what Amazon needs most now.

Apple: The “Invisible Referee” in This Deal

If the potential transaction between Amazon and Globalstar appears to be a surface-level “buyer-seller negotiation,” the true determinant of its outcome may well be a player not directly at the negotiating table: Apple. In this competition, Apple acts more like an “invisible referee,” whose stance not only influences whether the deal closes but could also reshape the power dynamics of the entire satellite internet ecosystem.

The reason lies in Apple’s 2024 investment of $1.5 billion in Globalstar, acquiring a 20% stake. Globalstar agreed to reserve 85% of its network capacity for Apple, primarily for iPhone’s “satellite SMS” functionality outside cellular coverage. For Amazon to complete the acquisition, it would need to engage in deep negotiations with its competitor, Apple.

From Apple’s perspective, satellite communication capabilities are becoming a crucial supplement to its hardware ecosystem. By embedding satellite SOS and other functions into terminal devices (end devices), Apple is extending “connectivity” from traditional cellular networks to broader extreme scenarios, enhancing product differentiation and subtly increasing user dependency on its ecosystem. In this context, if Globalstar is acquired by Amazon and its resource allocation logic shifts from “serving a single major client” to “building an open network,” the service priority and stability most valued by Apple could face uncertainty.

Thus, the core tension in this transaction is not merely an extension of competition between Amazon and SpaceX but also implies a clash between two distinct technological paths: on one side, Apple’s “closed ecosystem integration,” emphasizing deep control over key capabilities and consistent user experience; on the other, Amazon’s “open network expansion,” pursuing scale coverage and multi-scenario service capabilities. Before these two logics strike a balance, Apple’s attitude becomes a critical weight on the scales.

With Apple’s stance still unclear, this acquisition, capable of shaking the global satellite internet market landscape, remains highly uncertain.

The LEO Race Enters “Resource Integration Phase”

From a broader industry perspective, a more noteworthy shift is underway: the LEO satellite sector is transitioning from an early “technology validation phase” into a “resource integration phase.”

Over the past few years, the core narrative in the LEO race revolved around “feasibility”—whether high-frequency launches could be achieved, whether large-scale constellations could be built, and whether stable connectivity could be provided. During this phase, dominance lay with companies possessing engineering and launch capabilities, where technological breakthroughs themselves served as barriers. However, as leading players gradually complete constellation prototypes and commercial services begin to land, the industry’s focus is quietly shifting: the question is no longer “can it be done” but “who will control key resources.”

These “key resources” are highly scarce and irreplaceable. First are spectrum and orbital resources, whose allocation is fundamentally constrained by international coordination and regulatory oversight, inherently exclusive. Second are ground infrastructure and network access capabilities, which determine whether satellite networks can truly translate into usable services. Third are terminal entry points and user relationships—whether consumer electronics, enterprise clients, or industry applications, all serve as critical interfaces for monetizing connectivity. Once these resources are increasingly occupied by leading companies, latecomers, even with technological capabilities, will struggle to enter the competition at equivalent costs.

Against this backdrop, the industry is showing clear integration trends: through investment, collaboration, and even mergers and acquisitions, dispersed spectrum, network, and application capabilities are rapidly pieced together into systems. This integration is not just an efficiency choice but also a “positioning” move—occupying advantageous positions before resources are fully locked in. More deeply, competition at this stage is shifting from “whose technology is more advanced” to “who can build a more complete ecosystem.” Single capabilities can no longer sustain long-term competition; true barriers arise from cross-tier integration capabilities: from satellites in the sky to ground networks, to terminals and application scenarios in hands, forming closed loops.

Epilogue

Currently, both Amazon and Globalstar remain silent, declining to formally comment on these rumors. Regardless of whether the acquisition proceeds, the struggle for spectrum, networks, and terminal entry points is already in full swing. In this race, what may be reshaped is not just the competitive landscape but also the dominance over the next-generation connectivity infrastructure.