Huawei and Qualcomm Forge Patent Cross-Licensing Pact: Who Gains the Upper Hand?

10/08 2026 435

On October 5, Huawei officially disclosed that it had entered into a multi-year, comprehensive patent licensing accord with Qualcomm. This agreement encompasses the cross-licensing of patent portfolios across various domains, including 5G, computing, artificial intelligence, and networking. Additionally, it involves Qualcomm's acquisition of select U.S. patents from Huawei.

Before delving into the specifics of Huawei and Qualcomm's agreement, let's draw a parallel with a similar episode involving Intel and AMD.

From 1987, when AMD initiated a protracted legal battle against Intel over patent infringement and antitrust issues, to 2009, when the two tech giants announced a comprehensive settlement, the conflict spanned a staggering 22 years.

Another player, Cyrix, was also embroiled in this saga. It was eventually acquired by Shanghai Zhaoxin, paving the way for two distinct x86 development paths in China.

However, we'll reserve the tale of Cyrix for another occasion.

Retrospectively, it's challenging to assign absolute blame or credit to either side. More often than not, it was a tug-of-war over technological pathways, market demarcations, and commercial interests. Ultimately, both parties were left drained, compelling them to seek a balance of interests through a patent cross-licensing agreement. When patent disputes reach a certain juncture, courts seldom offer a definitive resolution; instead, commercial realities dictate that both sides must negotiate.

In November 2009, Intel and AMD announced a comprehensive settlement. Intel agreed to pay $1.25 billion, AMD withdrew all pending lawsuits, and the two companies signed a new five-year cross-licensing agreement.

The significance of this agreement transcended the mere "settlement fee."

Subsequent disclosures revealed that the cross-licensing agreement between Intel and AMD was not a singular document but a complex stack of multiple agreements, with the most recent signed in 2009. It encompassed the entire product portfolios of both companies, including CPUs, GPUs, DPUs, and FPGAs. AMD gained the right to utilize Intel's instruction set extensions (such as SSE and AVX) to manufacture x86 processors, while Intel could incorporate AMD's innovations into its own CPUs.

Crucially, this interdependence was bidirectional and symmetrical. While it was theoretically feasible to design x86 CPUs without AVX, SSE, or other extensions, "such processors would be unable to compete with modern counterparts." In essence, losing this license would be catastrophic for both AMD and Intel. The agreement also stipulated that if either party underwent a merger, acquisition, or joint venture that altered ownership, the agreement would immediately terminate, necessitating renegotiation by both sides.

This is the crux of patent cross-licensing: it's not a concession from one side to the other but a mutually assured deterrence achieved after prolonged strategic interaction.

You restrain me, and I restrain you, preventing either from escalating unilaterally. By 2025, analyses even suggested that if Broadcom were to acquire Intel's product business, AMD might invoke the termination clause of the cross-licensing agreement to "derail" the deal. An agreement signed in 2009 still wielded the power to influence industry dynamics more than a decade later.

Subsequently, China reaped an unexpected windfall. At AMD's nadir in 2016, Tianjin Hygon Group acquired authorization for the first-generation Zen architecture from AMD for $293 million, and the two entities established joint ventures: Hygon Integrated Circuits and Hygon Microelectronics.

This incident underscores that patents and licensing are never purely "technical matters." AMD required funds to produce and promote its Zen processors, while China sought technology and an entry point. Both sides secured what they needed.

Consequently, Hygon emerged as one of the few domestic companies capable of supplying x86 architecture processors. Its processors, compatible with the x86 instruction set, could effectively run millions of system software and application software based on x86, granting it a certain ecosystem advantage.

However, the "windfall" narrative has a crucial coda. Hygon's authorization was confined to the first-generation Zen architecture, excluding subsequent updates like Zen2 and Zen3. More critically, technological control remained firmly in the hands of Hygon Microelectronics, a joint venture 51% owned by AMD. "Hygon lacked technological autonomy."

In 2019, Hygon was added to the U.S. "Entity List," prompting AMD to immediately suspend new x86 IP authorizations to Hygon. Subsequently, Hygon could only iterate autonomously based on its existing authorizations, developing the C86 technology system.

From a commercial perspective, Hygon did reap benefits. Nevertheless, the limitations of this path were apparent: while technology imports could swiftly bridge performance gaps, they struggled to establish a genuine technological moat. Once international supply chains fluctuated, the "hollowing out" crisis of core technologies became evident.

The same logic becomes significantly more intricate when applied to Qualcomm and Huawei.

To advance 5G, Qualcomm cannot bypass Huawei's patents. According to the *Global 5G Standard Essential Patents and Standard Proposal Research Report (2026)* released by the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, Huawei accounted for 11.70% of valid patent families in global 5G standard essential patents, ranking first worldwide; its licensed patent families accounted for 13.15%, also leading by a substantial margin. Qualcomm ranked second with 8.05%, a notable gap.

Conversely, Huawei cannot sidestep Qualcomm's patents when developing chips and communication equipment. A hallmark of communication products is backward compatibility: 5G products often need to support 2G, 3G, and 4G simultaneously. In 3G networks, whether WCDMA, TD-SCDMA, or CDMA2000, Qualcomm's core CDMA technology is indispensable. To utilize these technical patents, Huawei must obtain authorization.

In July 2020, the two sides reached a settlement. Huawei agreed to pay Qualcomm a one-time sum of $1.8 billion, covering licensing fees for the last two quarters of 2019 and the first two quarters of 2020. Simultaneously, they signed a new long-term global patent licensing agreement, including a cross-license that permitted Qualcomm to repurchase certain patent rights from Huawei. Referencing Qualcomm's "6+2" agreement with Apple and its five-year deal with LG, industry observers speculated that Huawei's agreement with Qualcomm would also span approximately five years.

The nature of this deal was far more nuanced than a simple "winner or loser" scenario. Qualcomm secured cash and a long-term agreement, with its stock surging over 10% on the day, adding approximately 78.8 billion yuan ($11.3 billion) to its market value. Huawei resumed paying wireless technology licensing fees, ensuring it could utilize Qualcomm's wireless technologies within the agreement's scope without future concerns, even leaving room for Qualcomm to become its 5G chip supplier. Both sides obtained what they needed most at the time.

Thus, patent cross-licensing agreements are essentially pragmatic business maneuvers, neither a resounding victory nor a defeat.

They resemble a temporary truce and exchange of interests: you secure your licenses, I secure mine, and we continue conducting business and competing globally. Intel and AMD engaged in a 22-year battle, yet their agreement still governs their behavior today. Qualcomm and Huawei, each strong in 5G and 3G/4G, respectively, recognized their mutual dependence and negotiated a mutually acceptable deal.

However, I believe there is a "subtle victory" here.

Why?

Because strength speaks volumes. Simply sitting at the negotiating table is, in itself, a testament to strength. Not everyone can go head-to-head with Qualcomm. Many companies, let alone engage in cross-licensing, don't even qualify to be "challenged" by Qualcomm and can only passively pay fees. Huawei's ability to reach this juncture, to forge a mutually restraining relationship with Qualcomm across patents, standards, chips, and equipment, reflects its formidable strength. Huawei leads in 5G standard essential patents, while Qualcomm has deep roots in 3G/4G underlying technologies. This "intertwined" dynamic underscores Huawei's resilience.

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