In September 2026, action camera pioneer GoPro was acquired by an optical communications company for $285 million, a fraction of its peak market value of $13 billion.

GoPro once boasted impressive achievements: revenue doubling annually, a market value exceeding $10 billion, and founder Nick Woodman hailed as the "next Steve Jobs of hardware." Yet, it failed to become the Apple of imaging, instead becoming the next Nokia.

GoPro's story offers a valuable case study for today's imaging market: short-term earnings depend on costs, while long-term value hinges on a company's position in the final market landscape.

01 GoPro's Cautionary Tale

In 2002, surfer Nick Woodman used a rubber band to strap a camera to his wrist to capture his surfing moments, sparking GoPro's earliest inspiration. Twelve years later, in 2014, GoPro went public on NASDAQ. By 2015, its revenue peaked at $1.62 billion, nearly monopolizing the global action camera market.

But after the peak, the decline was as rapid as the ascent. In the fourth quarter of 2015, GoPro reported its first quarterly loss. In 2016, it ventured into drones with Karma, which was recalled after 16 days due to battery issues and exited the market within two years.

Karma's failure was merely a symptom. The deeper issue lay in GoPro's ecosystem, its core weakness.

Despite Woodman's public claims of being a "content production company," GoPro failed to develop a robust companion app. Users frequently complained about Quik, its editing software, citing crashes, lag, and inability to render long clips—official advice even suggested shortening footage before import to prevent crashes. By 2024, GoPro discontinued Quik's desktop version, outsourcing desktop editing to third parties.

Meanwhile, its flagship Hero series stagnated with incremental updates. Sensors remained unchanged since 2021, while overheating and short battery life persisted. Technological innovation stalled, leading to user attrition.

In 2022, GoPro held 84% of the global action camera market, but by Q3 2025, its share plummeted to 18%, while DJI claimed 66%. GoPro's 2025 revenue fell 20% year-on-year to $652 million, with its stock price crashing from $93 to under $2. From 2023 to 2025, cumulative losses reached $579 million (RMB 3.9 billion), culminating in its 2026 sale. The buyer valued GoPro's 2,500+ U.S. patents, not its camera business.

A category pioneer was left behind by the era it created, failing to invest for the long term during its peak.

02 Two Paths: Dimensional Strike and Redefinition

As users complained about GoPro's flaws, two Chinese companies—Insta360 and DJI—quietly seized the market. By the time GoPro noticed, the "three-way contest" had become a "duopoly."

DJI leveraged drone technology to dominate action and gimbal cameras, while Insta360 led the global 360-degree camera market. Based in Shenzhen, just 10 km apart, these companies redefined imaging tools from opposite directions.

DJI followed a path of "core technology expansion into adjacent categories." Its Pocket series adapted drone gimbal tech for ground shooting, selling over 10 million units. Expanding from drones to action cameras, 360-degree cameras, and even robotic vacuums, DJI migrated proven tech to new products. Its moat lies in flight control, obstacle avoidance, and navigation—hardware expertise honed over a decade.

Insta360 took a different route, centering on 360-degree imaging: stitching, stabilization, AI processing, and computational photography. It developed three custom chips, with R&D comprising nearly 60% of its workforce.

More critical than tech was its product definition.

Insta360 created a mass market for 360-degree cameras. Traditional action cameras relied on "predictive shooting," requiring users to pre-set angles and compositions. Insta360's 360-degree capture and post-editing allowed "shoot first, create later": the camera captured everything, letting users refine shots later. No more angle adjustments or missed moments.

From product definition, Insta360 transformed how users shoot and edit. Its Invisible Selfie Stick used algorithms to erase the stick from footage, mimicking drone tracking shots. The Snap selfie screen, a magnetic attachment for rear-camera selfies, solved blind-shooting pain points. This is product definition: not just better, but different.

Both companies are now shifting moats from hardware to software and ecosystems. Hardware leads last only six months, but software and ecosystems create compound, imitable barriers.

DJI is developing custom 3D-stacked AI chips for on-device inference, moving AI computing from the cloud to devices. Insta360 partnered with Amazon Web Services for "Moment Pro," enabling users to request videos (e.g., "clips with my kid") for automatic editing, music, and highlights. Both extend user-device relationships: shoot, edit, repeat, raising switching costs.

Simultaneously, both expand into new markets. DJI enters 360-degree cameras and robotic vacuums; Insta360 explores gimbals, drones, and robotic cameras.

03 Finale: Irreplaceable in Their Domains

In recent years, Insta360 and DJI have clashed across 360-degree cameras, action cameras, gimbals, and drones, competing on products and pricing. What will the imaging market's finale look like? A duopoly?

Not necessarily.

Traditional duopolies (e.g., Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi) split the same market, vying for the same demand: consumers choosing between two colas. This is zero-sum. DJI and Insta360, however, target different demands: DJI focuses on "flight" (aerial tech), while Insta360 centers on "creation" (content workflows).

Though they overlap in action and gimbal cameras, their approaches differ: DJI applies drone tech to 360-degree cameras; Insta360 extends imaging algorithms to drones. Their core tech, user perception, and ecosystems diverge, making mutual replacement unlikely. DJI's flight control relies on decades of flight data; Insta360's creation ecosystem hinges on understanding every step from shooting to sharing.

Thus, the finale likely sees DJI and Insta360 as irreplaceable in their domains, coexisting in overlapping markets with sustained competition.

The winner will be whoever strengthens their moat. This demands relentless R&D investment.

In H1 2026, Insta360 spent over RMB 1 billion on R&D (18.78% of revenue), stockpiled RMB 2 billion in chips, and invested RMB 762 million in new categories (80% of net profit). These numbers hurt profits but secure long-term positioning.

GoPro also invested: acquiring editing apps, developing chips, launching subscriptions. But its efforts lacked focus—acquired software remained poor, chips failed to reverse decline, and subscription revenue couldn't offset hardware losses. Insta360 focused on imaging algorithms and creation ecosystems; DJI on flight control and hardware. Both doubled down on core strengths, distinguishing "strategic bets" from "money burning."

Epilogue

In industries where the finale is unwritten, underinvesting is the greatest risk. GoPro neglected software ecosystems and second-growth areas during its peak, leaving it too late when short-term metrics worsened.

Insta360 and DJI's category expansions and ecosystem builds aren't about quarterly profits. DJI's move from drones to handheld devices and Insta360's shift from 360-degree cameras to drones and robotic cameras aim to secure long-term positions. Markets may question pace, but rarely direction.