Produced by | Frontline of Entrepreneurship

Art Editor | Qianqian

Reviewed by | Songwen

In July 2026, an 18-meter pure electric articulated bus rolled off the production line at the Longhai factory. The new vehicle features a full carbon fiber composite body and is designed for the European market. However, instead of a Chinese brand, the front of the bus displays the logo of Ebusco, a Dutch electric bus company.

The bus was manufactured by Golden Dragon Bus, a well-established Chinese bus manufacturer.

According to subsequent performance announcements by Ebusco, this Ebusco 3.0 is part of a 'larger batch' order from a European customer.

After leaving the Longhai factory, these 'Golden Dragon-made' buses return to Ebusco's facilities in the Netherlands and France for pre-delivery inspections according to European manufacturing standards.

This approach differs from Golden Dragon's previous methods of going global. In the past, Golden Dragon primarily exported buses bearing its Golden Dragon logo to overseas markets. Now, it has started contract manufacturing for European brands, becoming a contract manufacturer for them.

Behind this shift in identity, Golden Dragon Bus is also changing its position in the global bus industry chain.

Previously, Golden Dragon relied mainly on exporting complete buses to open up overseas markets, with competitiveness centered on manufacturing costs, delivery capabilities, and product adaptation. Now, through the Ebusco project, it has begun to undertake the production link (production processes) for European brands, integrating its manufacturing system into the research and development, certification, and delivery chains of European bus companies.

However, entering the supply chains of European brands does not automatically equate to brand upgrading. Although the buses are manufactured by Golden Dragon, brand ownership, customer relationships, and partial control over design and delivery remain with Ebusco. For Golden Dragon, such collaborations can secure orders and accumulate experience in manufacturing carbon fiber bodies and European-standard models, but they may also keep the company stuck in contract manufacturing with relatively limited profits and influence.

Especially given the ongoing financial constraints, order cancellations, and operational uncertainties faced by its partners, the contract manufacturing model brings not only access to high-end markets but also risks related to order continuity and payment collection.

This complexity epitomizes Golden Dragon's new phase in going global.

Competition in overseas markets is no longer just about how many buses are exported but about establishing local production, after-sales service, regulatory certifications, and brand recognition. From large-scale government procurement in Tunisia to contract manufacturing in the European market, and then to high-end product platforms like 'QianTu,' Golden Dragon is exploring multiple paths to find its new position in the global bus industry chain.

1. From 13 Buses to the Transformation of the 'Little Golden Dragon'

In the history of Xiamen's bus industry, 'Golden Dragon' is a name that can easily cause confusion.

A more well-known entity is the listed company King Long Motor Group. Under King Long Motor Group, there are three core bus companies: Xiamen Golden Dragon Bus Co., Ltd., commonly known as 'Big Golden Dragon' in the industry, with the English brand name King Long; King Long United Automotive Industry (Suzhou) Co., Ltd., which uses the Higer Bus brand with the English name Higer; and Xiamen Golden Dragon Traveler Co., Ltd., which is Golden Dragon Bus, with the English brand name Golden Dragon.

These three companies belong to the King Long Motor Group but each has its own product system, production base, and sales channels.

Unlike many automotive companies founded and long led by individual entrepreneurs, Golden Dragon Bus does not have a typical 'founder' who is both the creator, actual controller, and spokesperson. If we trace the company's origins, we cannot overlook Huang Peiyu, regarded as one of the main founders of Xiamen's automotive industry.

In the late 1980s, Xiamen lacked a complete automotive industry foundation. Huang Peiyu was tasked with establishing Xiamen Automotive Industry Corporation. The initial plan was to secure a portion of the 300,000-unit sedan project from the Second Automobile Works (now Dongfeng Motor Corporation) to be located in Xiamen, but this plan ultimately failed.

At that time, Xiamen lacked both automotive manufacturing capabilities and a mature parts (parts and components) industry chain. After the project faced cancellation, Huang Peiyu insisted on retaining the assembled team and shifting the focus from sedans to buses, which required higher investment thresholds.

Around 1989, the establishment of the 'Little Golden Dragon,' known as Xiamen Golden Dragon Traveler, entered the planning stage.

The 'Little' in 'Little Golden Dragon' did not refer to the company's small scale but to Huang Peiyu's vision of producing 'smaller vehicles.' At that time, 'Big Golden Dragon' primarily focused on large and medium-sized buses, while 'Little Golden Dragon' explored light buses and small commercial vehicles.

In 1992, Xiamen Golden Dragon Traveler Co., Ltd. was officially established and gradually developed into today's Golden Dragon Bus.

In its early days, Golden Dragon Bus also engaged in assembly operations, relying on imported parts and components to manufacture buses. Public records show that the company initially produced only 13 trial vehicles with an output value of approximately 2 million yuan. Around 1997, Golden Dragon began producing Coaster-style medium-sized buses; after entering the 21st century, its product range gradually expanded from light buses to large and medium-sized buses.

In 2003, the company registered the 'Golden Dragon' trademark to strengthen its brand identity outside the complex 'Golden Dragon' naming system.

Since then, Coaster, city buses, coach buses, and new energy buses have formed Golden Dragon's main product lineup. Golden Dragon has transformed from a company that started with parts assembly into a complete vehicle manufacturer capable of researching, developing, and manufacturing large, medium, and light buses.

Data shows that from 2021 to 2023, the company's operating revenue increased from 4.745 billion yuan to 5.341 billion yuan, while its net profit shifted from a loss of 364 million yuan and 189 million yuan to a profit of 40.02 million yuan. In 2024, Golden Dragon's revenue further increased to 6.308 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of approximately 18.1%, but its net profit was only 42.19 million yuan.

This 'weakness' in operating performance is partly due to the gradual saturation of growth in the domestic market. Therefore, going global has become a must for Golden Dragon Bus and many other companies in recent years.

In 2025, Golden Dragon Bus exported more than 9,000 buses, with overseas revenue accounting for 57% of its total revenue, making overseas markets a significant driver of business growth. However, whether export volume can be further converted into higher profits and more stable cash returns remains a key criterion for measuring its globalization success.

Compared to the question faced by Huang Peiyu's generation—'Can Xiamen manufacture automobiles?'—the challenge for today's management has shifted: Can a Chinese bus company with over 30 years of manufacturing experience and a presence in numerous overseas markets break free from reliance on pricing and single orders to establish stable customer relationships, sustainable profitability, and genuine brand premium in the global market?

'Moving from selling more buses to building a truly global brand involves multiple thresholds, including localized operations, stable profitability, and market influence,' said an industry observer who has long followed the bus market.

2. Two Paths to Going Global: Operating in Markets vs. Selling Production Capacity

Measuring the internationalization of a bus company involves not just quantity but also quality.

In February 2026, a cargo ship carrying Chinese buses arrived at the port of La Goulette near the Tunisian capital, having sailed along the Mediterranean coast. These vehicles were subsequently distributed to multiple local public transportation companies to update aging bus fleets.

This is one of Golden Dragon's most representative overseas projects in recent years.

Tunisia, located at the northernmost tip of North Africa, faces Italy across the Mediterranean Sea. Due to historical and industrial ties, the local bus market has long relied on European vehicles: some companies purchase European chassis and assemble bodies locally, while others directly use second-hand European buses.

Without a mandatory scrappage system, many buses are 15 to 20 years old. The accumulated demand for replacing aging vehicles has provided an opportunity for Chinese bus companies to enter the local market.

In early 2026, Golden Dragon announced it had secured an order for 462 buses in Tunisia, covering 12-meter and 18-meter models, to be deployed by 15 bus companies in 14 cities across the country. Golden Dragon hailed it as the 'largest-ever government public vehicle procurement order in Tunisian history' and a major breakthrough in the North African market.

As early as 2018, Golden Dragon began SKD (semi-knocked-down) operations for its 'Pioneer' high-end buses in Tunisia. Initially, demand for SKD services was limited, serving more as a 'ticket' for Golden Dragon to enter the market: leveraging local partners' familiarity with certification rules, procurement systems, and operational needs while gradually building brand recognition.

According to Golden Dragon Bus, since launching its global KD (knocked-down) factory strategy, it has established 17 overseas KD projects, claiming to be a leader in the Chinese bus industry for overseas KD factory Layout (deployment). Other industry media reports state that since initiating its global KD strategy in 2017, Golden Dragon has implemented CKD (completely-knocked-down) projects in more than 10 countries and regions along the 'Belt and Road'.

However, KD operations are neither a simple export of complete buses nor a mature overseas manufacturing base but a model somewhere in between: core production remains domestic, while product adaptation, assembly collaboration, after-sales training, and customer relationships gradually extend to local markets.

For example, to meet the high-salt, high-humidity coastal and high-temperature, dusty inland environments in Tunisia, Golden Dragon made adaptive developments in vehicle corrosion resistance, sealing, and body strength.

Golden Dragon disclosed plans to advance service network construction and local operation and maintenance training with Tunisian partners while exploring follow-up collaborations in new energy buses and intelligent dispatch systems.

This is the crux of overseas exports. After delivering the 462 vehicles, the true test of whether Tunisia can become a 'North African hub' lies in whether spare parts arrive on time, whether local personnel can independently perform maintenance, and whether the initial batch of vehicles leads to repeat orders.

If the Tunisia project represents Golden Dragon facing end customers under its Golden Dragon brand, its collaboration with Ebusco, a Dutch electric bus company, embodies a different logic for going global: the brand steps back while manufacturing capabilities take center stage.

In July 2026, an 18-meter carbon fiber pure electric articulated bus rolled off the line at Golden Dragon's Longhai factory. The vehicle was manufactured by Golden Dragon but bore the Ebusco logo.

According to both parties, Golden Dragon's collaboration with Ebusco began around 2012, initially involving aluminum-bodied models and later extending to carbon fiber composite models.

For Golden Dragon, being able to manufacture an 18-meter carbon fiber pure electric articulated bus demonstrates its competitiveness in craftsmanship, quality control, and supply chain organization.

However, manufacturing a European-branded bus and establishing a Chinese bus brand in Europe are two entirely different dimensions. Ebusco refers to Golden Dragon as a contract manufacturer in its business reports.

According to the public division of labor, after manufacturing at Golden Dragon's Longhai factory, the vehicles undergo pre-delivery inspections and final software work at Ebusco's facilities in Doorn, the Netherlands, and Rouen, France. In other words, Golden Dragon primarily handles manufacturing and supply chain execution, while Ebusco controls the product brand, European customer relationships, and final delivery.

This division of labor means the value each party derives from the same vehicle differs. Golden Dragon secures manufacturing revenue, improves factory capacity utilization, and gains engineering experience in carbon fiber bodies and European models; Ebusco benefits not just from the vehicles but also from lighter production organization and lower fixed costs.

Crucially, after the vehicles enter operation, operators and passengers see the Ebusco logo, and the market reputation formed by vehicle reliability, energy consumption, and user experience primarily accrues to the Ebusco brand.

More notably, neither party has disclosed details about the contract manufacturing price, profit distribution, intellectual property arrangements, or whether Golden Dragon can apply relevant manufacturing experience to its own branded products.

The claim of 'entering the European high-end new energy bus market' is more accurately described as Golden Dragon entering the production supply chain of European new energy buses rather than the Golden Dragon brand entering European end markets.

The Tunisia and Ebusco projects directly illustrate the two sides of Golden Dragon's global expansion: in Tunisia, Golden Dragon advances toward end markets with its own brand; in Europe, it embeds its manufacturing capabilities into others' value chains while keeping its brand hidden.

The former requires bearing the costs of market development and service construction, while the latter lowers entry barriers through partners but necessitates ceding brand and channel benefits. Over time, Golden Dragon may gain more market access channels but not stronger market control.

As for the critical aspects of project profitability, payment cycles, repeat orders, and the sustainability of after-sales systems in its global expansion models, Golden Dragon Bus has yet to provide definitive answers.

3. Exporting Overseas Does Not Equate to Profit Retention

For domestic bus companies today, going global is no longer an optional strategy.

After the Centralized replacement (centralized replacement) of domestic public transportation with new energy vehicles, the market has gradually shifted to Stock update (stock replacement). When domestic growth slows, overseas markets become crucial for both revenue growth and capacity utilization.

However, shifting orders overseas does not automatically improve business quality.

In 2024, Golden Dragon's operating revenue reached approximately 6.308 billion yuan, up about 18% year-on-year, while its net profit was approximately 42.19 million yuan, an increase of only about 2.17 million yuan from 40.02 million yuan in 2023. This translates to a net profit margin of less than 0.7%—meaning Golden Dragon earned less than 1 yuan in net profit for every 100 yuan in revenue.

While revenue grew rapidly, profit improvement remained limited. These figures provide essential context for observing Golden Dragon's global expansion: although recent overseas business expansion and sales growth have expanded its operating scale, they have not necessarily brought corresponding profit growth. Price competition, customized development, international transportation, after-sales support, and payment cycles all erode the profits contributed by orders.

The Tunisia project embodies such contradictions. With 462 buses operating across multiple cities, the upfront investment in operations and after-sales service channels may struggle to translate into sustained order conversions in the short term.

The partnership with Ebusco, however, faces a different set of risks.

Contract manufacturing for European brands allows King Long to engage with Europe's high-end electric bus manufacturing standards while boosting capacity utilization at its Longhai factory. However, King Long's bargaining power in the collaboration hinges on Ebusco's ability to secure continuous orders, raise funds, and deliver as planned.

As of the first half of 2026, Ebusco had delivered only 16 buses, generating €22 million in revenue, with cash and cash equivalents totaling €2.1 million at period-end. The company publicly acknowledged ongoing liquidity constraints, with funding issues affecting production speeds and vehicle deliveries by contract manufacturers, while warning of significant uncertainty regarding its ability to continue operations.

Thus, even if the collaboration proceeds smoothly, the brand value and actual benefits King Long gains may remain limited. For a company aspiring to transition from a traditional vehicle manufacturer to a global brand, contract manufacturing revenue and brand premium are two distinct matters.

Beyond contract manufacturing, King Long is also attempting to build a stronger brand image through its proprietary high-end products.

In August this year, King Long officially launched its "QianTu" series platform. Covering vehicle lengths from 8 to 15 meters, the platform supports pure electric, hybrid, diesel, and gas powertrains, targeting tourism, passenger transport, commuting, and cross-border shipping scenarios.

Amid today's highly customized bus orders, King Long aims to use the QianTu platform's unified underlying architecture to cover multiple sizes and powertrain variants, improve component compatibility, and serve both domestic and international markets simultaneously.

According to corporate disclosures, the QianTu launch event secured over 500 signed orders, with an additional 100+ overseas orders previously obtained. By September 2026, King Long further claimed that the platform's domestic and international orders had approached 1,000 units.

However, no public sources currently verify how many of these nearly 1,000 announced orders represent formal contracts, dealer framework agreements, or paid deposits with production scheduling underway.

More than three decades ago, when Huang Peiyu spearheaded the establishment of "Little King Long," the primary challenge was establishing production capabilities from scratch. Starting with imported component assembly and 13 pilot vehicles, King Long sought to secure its place in China's bus industry.

Today, King Long successfully sells vehicles across multiple global markets. Yet the gap between global product presence and becoming a true global brand remains bridged by localization, sustained profitability, technical standards, after-sales systems, and brand recognition.

For King Long, the next challenge lies not in how many more countries it can sell to, but in answering whether customers will pay a premium for its brand and whether its vehicles can consistently generate reputation throughout their lifecycle.

The journey from traditional vehicle manufacturer to global brand has become a longer road for King Long. And this path, clearly, will not be easy.

*Note: Images in the article are sourced from King Long's official channels.