Baidu's AI Revenue Tops 50% for the First Time, Yet Shares Hit Record Low—Baidu Is Still Essentially Selling Computing Power

11/17 2026 589

On the evening of November 16, just four days after hosting the "Baidu World 2026 Conference," Baidu Group released its unaudited financial results for the third quarter ended September 30, 2026.

The report shows that Baidu generated total revenue of 30.807 billion yuan in Q3. Excluding iQIYI, "Baidu Core" (which posted revenue of 24.973 billion yuan, up 1% year on year) saw its AI-powered new business revenue reach 13.2 billion yuan, up 37% year on year, accounting for 53% of Baidu Core revenue. This marks the third consecutive quarter—after Q1 and Q2 of this year—that Baidu's AI new business has accounted for more than half of its core business revenue.

The secondary market, however, was not impressed by that 53%. During intraday trading in Hong Kong on November 17, Baidu's shares plunged over 7% to HK$69.7, a record low, dragging its total market capitalization down to HK$190 billion and its price-to-book (P/B) ratio to a mere 0.61.

With 276.6 billion yuan in cash and investment reserves and AI revenue surpassing 50% for the first time, why has the capital market voted no confidence in Baidu?

The Advertising Cash Cow That Sustained Baidu for Two Decades Is Running Out of Steam

In Q3 2026, online marketing services (i.e., traditional search and feed advertising) within Baidu Core brought in 11.9 billion yuan, plunging 22% from 15.3 billion yuan a year earlier and down 9% quarter on quarter.

As advertising revenue shrank, online marketing services' share of Baidu Core revenue fell from 62% in Q3 2025 and 52% in Q2 this year to 48% in Q3. That 48% means that for the first time since Robin Li founded Baidu in 2000, the cash cow that had relied on Chinese search engine bidding rankings and feed advertising to deliver supersized gross margins and abundant cash flow for over two decades has seen its share of core revenue drop below 50%.

Excluding the 13.2 billion yuan from "core AI new business," the "traditional business" within Baidu Core generated only 9.4 billion yuan in Q3, down 24% from 12.5 billion yuan a year earlier and down 10% quarter on quarter.

Even Baidu's "AI-native marketing services"—which Baidu had high hopes for and sought to use to replace traditional search advertising—also turned downward this quarter. The report shows that in Q3, Baidu's AI-native marketing services revenue was 2.4 billion yuan, down 15% from 2.8 billion yuan a year earlier and down 7% quarter on quarter.

Why did both traditional advertising and AI-native advertising become hard to sell at the same time in Q3?

Baidu explained in the report that the macroeconomic environment remains challenging and advertisers are tightening budgets; the competitive landscape is constantly shifting; and at this stage of Baidu's AI search transformation, the company is "strategically prioritizing user experience over short-term monetization."

"Prioritizing user experience," in other words, means that when users open Baidu to search for answers, Baidu's AI large model presents organized answers directly at the top. It looks cleaner, but it directly reduces the number of clicks on commercial promotion links below, and the original pay-per-click advertising inventory is being cannibalized by Baidu's own AI answers.

Even more serious than the internal monetization problem is the diversion of external traffic gateways.

The report discloses that as of September 2026, the Baidu App's monthly active users (MAU) stood at 604 million. By comparison, the Baidu App's MAU was still 655 million in Q1 this year, edged down to 644 million in Q2, and fell directly to 604 million by the end of Q3. In just one quarter, the Baidu App lost about 40 million MAU.

Where did the users go? QuestMobile's September 2026 ranking of AI-native app MAU shows that ByteDance's "Doubao" surged to 419 million MAU, firmly ranking first in China, followed by Alibaba's Qianwen, DeepSeek, and Tencent's Yuanbao, while Baidu's standalone office intelligent agent "Baidu Dazi" ranked only tenth. As more and more young users habitually open Doubao, Yuanbao, or Xiaohongshu to search for guides and ask for answers, the search box moat Baidu has guarded for twenty years is being abandoned.

8.2 Billion Yuan in AI Cloud to the Rescue, Yet Still Unable to Fill the Profit Gap

Precisely because the old business lost 4.1 billion yuan, the 3.6 billion yuan incremental growth in AI new business against the trend in Q3 became the lifesaver that helped Baidu stabilize its 30.8 billion yuan revenue base.

Baidu's core AI new business consists of three pillars: intelligent cloud infrastructure, AI applications, and AI-native marketing services. In Q3, AI-native marketing services revenue was 2.4 billion yuan, down 15%. The AI application business—which Robin Li repeatedly emphasized "in the long run is more profitable than selling computing power and selling Tokens"—posted Q3 revenue of 2.6 billion yuan, with year-on-year growth of 0% and only a slight 1% increase quarter on quarter—essentially standing still.

In other words, the entire AI segment's growth at Baidu in Q3 was 100% carried by the hard-working "intelligent cloud infrastructure" business of selling computing power alone.

In Q3, Baidu intelligent cloud infrastructure revenue reached 8.2 billion yuan, surging 94% from 4.2 billion yuan a year earlier, with a single-quarter net increase of 4 billion yuan in revenue—even exceeding the entire core AI business's net increase of 3.6 billion yuan. Within this, GPU cloud revenue delivered via subscription-based computing power surged 191% year on year and 43% quarter on quarter. Token call revenue from external customers on the Qianfan MaaS platform surged 1,159% year on year. In addition, the autonomous driving business "Apollo Go," which had cumulatively driven over 390 million kilometers globally as of the end of October, also achieved a 170% quarter-on-quarter increase in fully driverless orders in Shenzhen and doubled its fleet size in Dubai.

Since intelligent cloud earned an extra 4 billion yuan in one go, fully covering the 3.4 billion yuan hole left by the search advertising decline, why is the capital market still unwilling to give Baidu a favorable look?

Because the "4 billion yuan computing power revenue" and the "3.4 billion yuan search advertising revenue" are vastly different in quality on the income statement and cash flow statement.

In the past, Baidu's search advertising was a hugely profitable business with almost zero marginal cost and gross margins consistently above 70%. Now Baidu selling GPU cloud computing power is a genuine heavy-asset, hard business. Every time a customer signs a multi-year computing power contract, Baidu must spend real money to buy expensive AI chips, build large data center facilities, pay huge electricity bills, and bear annual equipment depreciation.

This replacement of "high-margin advertising retreating, low-margin computing power rising" directly crushed Baidu's profit margins.

In Q3, while total revenue slightly declined 1% to 30.807 billion yuan, Baidu's cost of sales instead rose 9% against the trend to 19.892 billion yuan. The report explicitly stated that the cost increase was mainly due to "increased costs related to the cloud business." Dragged down by this, Baidu Group's Q3 consolidated gross profit shrank from 12.859 billion yuan a year earlier to 10.915 billion yuan, and consolidated gross margin dropped directly from 41.2% to 35.4%—falling nearly 6 percentage points in one year.

To protect profits, Baidu cut selling and administrative expenses by 17% in Q3 alone, and even R&D expenses—where Baidu had always been willing to spend generously—were reduced 7% year on year.

Even after squeezing the three expenses to the extreme, profits remain thin. In Q3, under GAAP, Baidu's net profit attributable to Baidu was 1.395 billion yuan, down 40% quarter on quarter from 2.319 billion yuan in Q2. Under non-GAAP, net profit attributable to Baidu was 2.395 billion yuan, plunging 36.5% from 3.770 billion yuan a year earlier.

To appease shareholders, Baidu has already spent US$373 million repurchasing shares since the beginning of the year and reiterated in its Q3 report that it expects to announce the company's first-ever common stock dividend before the end of 2026.

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