[Chaoxi Business Review/Text]

Li Ran crouched at his workstation, repeatedly adding and removing items from his online shopping cart, unsure which power bank to buy.

In his cart were three options: a premium overseas brand, slightly more expensive but with comments like 'No issues in two years'; an ecosystem product from a major phone manufacturer, priced reasonably and clearly listing its battery cell supplier, which inspired confidence; and a brand he had used throughout his student days, offering large capacity at less than half the price of the others, with its usual simple design.

'The first retractable charging cable I bought in college was this cheaper one. It cost around 20 bucks and lasted for years—a real bargain for students. But now, I think I'll go for something safer and choose a brand that matches my phone, even if it means spending more for peace of mind,' Li Ran muttered to himself before placing his order.

Li Ran's hesitation reflects a microcosm of the structural transformation underway in the 3C accessories industry.

Once a wildly growing sector, it remains a significant part of the global consumer electronics landscape.

According to a 2025 research report by YH Research, the global consumer electronics accessories market was valued at approximately RMB 1,488 billion in 2024 and is expected to approach RMB 2,062 billion by 2031.

Focusing solely on mobile phone accessories, a report by Daxue Consulting indicates that the global market reached USD 270.28 billion in 2025, with non-OEM third-party accessories accounting for 65%, holding a dominant position.

However, this narrative of scale masks an ongoing structural transformation. Data from Daxue Consulting reveals that mobile phone OEMs are leveraging their system ecosystem advantages to enter the accessories market aggressively. In the power bank segment, the 2025 3C safety verification controversy accelerated this trend.

Industry research shows that the sub-USD 100 market is shrinking, the mid-range market (USD 100–150) is expanding, and the premium market (above USD 150) is dominated by Anker and Huawei, with a relatively stable landscape.

In simple terms, the 'parasitic logic' that third-party accessory brands relied on—focusing on products that OEMs did not produce or did poorly—is rapidly becoming ineffective.

OEMs view accessories as an extension of their ecosystem moat, while unbranded products flood the market with ultra-low prices on platforms like Douyin and Pinduoduo. These two forces are squeezing third-party brands into an increasingly narrow 'middle zone.'

Baseus is the most representative—and anxious—player in this middle zone.

01 Baseus: Breaking Through the Pack?

Players in the current 3C accessories market can be broadly categorized into four groups based on their competitive strategies.

Anker Innovation represents the 'technology brand' camp, relying on years of R&D investment to build patent barriers. In 2025, its annual revenue reached RMB 30.514 billion, with R&D spending increasing to RMB 2.893 billion, accounting for 9.48% of revenue.

Ugreen exemplifies the 'full-category expansion' approach. In 2025, its revenue grew by 53.83% year-on-year to RMB 9.491 billion, with its NAS storage business surging by 213.2% to RMB 1.23 billion.

Additionally, there are the 'ecosystem-bundled' players like Xiaomi and Huawei, as well as the 'niche-focused' players like Torras and Shinemag.

Baseus follows a different path. It lacks Anker's multi-brand matrix, Xiaomi's ecosystem barriers, or Ugreen's in-house production capabilities and core certifications like Apple's MFi.

Baseus's model can be summarized by a simple formula: scenario-based micro-innovation + cost-effectiveness + rapid omnichannel distribution.

It quickly defines products around three key scenarios—travel, office, and home—creating perceived differentiation through innovations like retractable chargers and multi-port GaN chargers. Priced at around 70% of Anker's equivalents, it leverages profits from mature e-commerce platforms to fuel market share expansion in emerging channels.

According to Baseus's disclosed data, it completed a RMB-hundreds-of-millions Series A funding round led by Shenzhen Capital Group and CICC Capital in 2023, followed by another Series A+ round led by Shenzhen Capital Group. With over 300 million global users, Baseus has carved out a niche in the red ocean by adhering to three principles: speed, broad reach, and attractive pricing.

However, the vulnerabilities of this strategy stem from these same principles.

'Speed' comes at the cost of inconsistent quality control. Operating on an asset-light model, Baseus relies heavily on external OEMs for production. When a brand's product line spans dozens of categories, including power banks, data cables, earphones, car mounts, and outdoor power stations, supply chain complexity grows exponentially.

During the power bank safety crisis in June 2025, Baseus had multiple products' 3C certification suspended due to its upstream battery cell supplier, Ampricus, illegally switching separator materials. According to ChargerLAB's industry statistics, Baseus had 38 SKUs with suspended CCC certificates, second only to Romoss.

Although Baseus claimed its in-stock products were not from the affected batches, the market does not distinguish between 'batch risks' and 'brand risks.' Consumers simply remembered seeing Baseus on the problem list.

'Broad reach' means nothing is done thoroughly. As Shinemag's founder once noted at an industry forum, the 'scattergun' approach has a low ceiling in the accessories market. If a brand cannot rank in the top two for a niche category, it struggles to gain bargaining power with suppliers and ends up 'selling everything but making nothing.'

Baseus competes across multiple categories—chargers, data cables, power banks, earphones, and car accessories—facing different market leaders in each. The cost of resource dispersion is real.

'Attractive pricing' is now undercut by even cheaper unbranded products following the 2025 power bank safety storm.

Once power bank prices drop below RMB 69, unbranded products on Douyin and Pinduoduo can slash prices to RMB 39 or even lower. Brands like Capdase, SCUD, Aigo, Sanrio, and Coolpad all offer sub-RMB 69 options, eroding Baseus's value proposition of 'good-looking and affordable.'

02 'Squeezed from Above and Below': Structural Disadvantages

Today, as the industry collectively strives to upgrade, Baseus finds itself lacking the 'strategic weapons' for breakthrough.

Compared to Anker Innovation, the most obvious gap lies in R&D 'depth.'

Anker's 2025 financial report shows R&D spending of RMB 2.893 billion, accounting for 9.48% of revenue, with 3,026 global patents, including 308 invention patents. This investment extends beyond charging power metrics to foundational technologies like battery cell management, energy storage safety, and GaN material commercialization—technologies that are reusable across categories, forming an 'R&D foundation.'

In contrast, Baseus has filed around 2,500 patents, primarily utility models and designs, with a notable shortage of invention patents.

Compared to Ugreen, the gap lies in establishing a 'second growth curve.'

While Ugreen achieved RMB 1.23 billion in NAS private cloud sales in 2025 (up 213% year-on-year), Baseus remains focused on horizontal category expansion. Ugreen holds Apple's MFi certification, a signal to consumers of official compatibility and reliability.

Baseus's lack of core certifications limits its ability to compete at higher price points. Meanwhile, Ugreen swiftly switched to top-tier battery cell suppliers during the 2025 industry crisis, capitalizing on the safety substitution trend. In July 2025, Ugreen's JD.com sales surged by 303% year-on-year, with market share increasing by 2.3 percentage points. Ugreen captured the 'certainty dividend' as consumers flocked to quality brands during the industry shakeout.

Compared to OEMs like Xiaomi and Huawei, the gap lies in the 'ecosystem moat.'

When Huawei phone users see a system pop-up recommending 'original Huawei chargers for optimal fast charging,' third-party brands face a different competitive dimension. By 2025, OEMs accounted for 41% of the accessories market, surpassing third-party brands' combined 38.6%.

If competitive pressure from these three fronts represents normal industry rivalry, Baseus's performance during the 2025 'Romoss collapse' revealed deeper structural vulnerabilities.

According to GfK China data, Romoss previously held a 13.3% share of the online power bank market. After its shutdown, over 20% of its market share was redistributed—but not to Baseus.

Xiaomi and Ugreen captured this share. Qianxun Data shows Ugreen's revenue growth far outpaced Anker's in Q3 2025, with capital market (capital markets) responding positively.

Why did Baseus miss this historic opportunity? The answer lies in its earlier quality control and certification crises.

As consumers fled Romoss due to safety concerns, they also saw Baseus on the problem list. At this industry turning point prioritizing 'safety and reliability,' Baseus failed to upgrade from a 'cost-effective choice' to a 'trustworthy choice.'

Today, Baseus occupies an awkward position: it is not perceived as a top-tier 'safe brand,' yet its prices lack the advantage of unbranded products.

03 A 'Strategic Upgrade' That Can't Wait

Facing these challenges, Baseus's countermeasures over the past year can be summarized in three directions: compliance catch-up, supply chain restructuring, and category expansion.

In compliance, Baseus shifted from 'passive adherence' to 'proactive standard-setting.'

As a participant in drafting the new national standard, it launched a power bank line compliant with the 2026 version and partnered with aerospace-grade labs for safety verification. It introduced 'SafeTouch NFC,' a battery health detection feature, aiming to rebuild consumer trust.

In supply chain management, Baseus switched its core battery cell suppliers to industry leaders like EVE Energy and Lishen to move beyond the Ampricus shadow.

For category expansion, Baseus continued to venture into audio, automotive, and outdoor power, with its open-ear headphone segment growing 560% year-on-year in Q3 2025, capturing a 7% global market share—tied with Anker in this niche.

After three quarters of catch-up, Baseus saw slight business recovery in Q4.

According to ChargerLAB's Tmall 3C Digital Double 11 Power Bank Store Sales Ranking (October 20–November 11, 2025, sorted by effective transaction value), the Baseus flagship store ranked #1, followed by Xiaomi's official store (#2) and Coolpo's flagship store (#3).

On JD.com's cumulative power bank leaderboard for the same period, Xiaomi ranked #1, Coolpo #2, and Baseus #3, with Huawei, Pisen, and Ugreen among the top 10.

Ranking #1 on Tmall and top 3 on JD.com demonstrates Baseus's continued strong consumer appeal—it remains an unavoidable option for accessory shoppers.

However, a deeper look reveals that Baseus's moves are more about patching up existing competition than achieving strategic breakthroughs.

'Participating in drafting the new national standard' addresses compliance risks but does not build differentiation. The new standard is an industry entry threshold—all surviving brands will eventually meet it, offering Baseus no premium.

'Partnering with EVE Energy' is not unique to Baseus. As a top Chinese battery cell supplier, EVE Energy's client list includes other major consumer electronics brands.

In audio, while Baseus captured 7% of the open-ear headphone market, this crowded segment is already dominated by Shokz and Huawei at the premium end. How much profit Baseus can extract remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, Baseus positions itself as a 'new lifestyle digital brand,' attempting to upgrade to a lifestyle brand. However, accessories inherently lack brand loyalty. Consumers do not buy Baseus earphones because they use Baseus chargers, nor do they choose Baseus outdoor power stations because they are satisfied with Baseus power banks.

Accessories represent a purely 'functional transaction' in consumers' minds—they buy what is cheap and reliable, with minimal brand premium. 'Lifestyle brand upgrade' remains an unproven proposition in the accessories category.

Consumer feedback indicates that rebuilding trust will be a long road for Baseus.

On Heimao Complaints Platform, Baseus's cumulative complaints continued to rise by the end of 2025, with many focusing on product quality and after-sales service issues.

For Baseus, moving beyond the 2025 safety crisis requires not just financial investment in products and supply chains but also more sincere actions in after-sales and consumer rights protection. Once safety trust is lost, repairing it takes far longer than acquiring new customers.

China's 3C accessories industry has moved beyond the 'easy money' era. Safety is now standard, technology is a barrier, and branding drives premiums.

Baseus has a low floor—cost-effectiveness, channel reach, and distribution capabilities ensure it will not disappear easily. But its ceiling is becoming clear. As more consumers like Li Ran prioritize 'peace of mind' over 'saving money,' the 'middle zone'—being 'slightly better-looking than unbranded and slightly cheaper than OEM'—is shifting from Baseus's comfort zone to its most uncomfortable position.

Two months later, Li Ran's former roommate Zhang Lei also bought a new power bank. 'I stuck with the brand we liked in college. I'm used to it and really like it,' he said.

Perhaps there is still room for the 'middle ground' in consumers' shopping carts. However, when more and more people start to ask, like Li Ran, 'Is it trustworthy?', how long can those old users who 'still quite like it' hold on?